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FoREwoRD
Matthew S. Steffey*
The papers in this symposium cover a range of criminal law topics. Four
address the philosophy or reality of criminal practice. Two others call for a
change in a feature of Constitutional law, one arguing for broader protection of
the integrity of the home when police seek to effect a warrantless arrest of a suspect who answers his door, the other arguing for greater assurance that prospective jurors in capital cases are open to both death and life as possible sentences.
Another Article and a student Comment debate limits of federal authority over
arguably local crime, and a final student Note discusses the United States
Supreme Court's recently confirmed limits on suspicionless drug testing.
In Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Evidence in Mississippi Courts,1 Robert M.
Ryan provides a primer on the interplay between Mississippi Rules of Evidence
404(b)2 and 403.' Ryan explains that courts recognize how evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or bad acts committed by a criminal defendant can be extraordinarily prejudicial; hence improper admission of other bad acts evidence is often
reversible error. So is a trial judge's failure to give a tailored limiting instruction,
one that both forbids improper use of the evidence as proof of criminal character
or propensity and that identifies the permissible use of the evidence, for example, as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' Ryan further argues that, under Rule 403,
the potential prejudice should be weighed against the marginal probative value of
the other bad acts evidence, after considering alternative, less prejudicial means
of proof.
In Are CapitalDefense Lawyers Educable?A Moderately Hopeful Report From
the Trenches,' David L. Szlanfucht examines Georgia death penalty appeals from
1973 through 1998 as a sample test of whether, as United States Supreme Court
capital punishment law has become more settled, lawyers have made fewer egregious mistakes during capital trials.6 Noting that the frequency of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims is decreasing, as is the frequency of apparently egregious errors at trial, Szlanfucht concludes that lawyers are making fewer obvious
blunders, and doing a better job generally, in representing capital defendants.
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., University of South Florida; J.D., Florida State
University; LL.M., Columbia University.
1. 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 345 (1999).
2. Miss. R. EviD. 404(b) sets forth when evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is admissible.
3. Miss. R. EVID. 403 sets forth the balancing test to determine when "relevant" evidence may be properly
excluded as unfairly prejudicial.
4. See Miss. R. EviD. 404(b).
5. 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 305 (1999).
6. Szlanfucht defines egregious mistakes according to criteria set out in William S. Geimer, A Decade of
Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and PracticalUndermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J.91 (1991).
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In her Article, The Role of the Defense Attorney in Mitigating the Nonviolent
Youthful Offender and Locating the AppropriateAlternative Sentence,7 Vicki L.
Gilliam suggests that defense lawyers have a duty to present the human face of
young offenders to the criminal justice system. Defense counsel should work to
identify a client's problems and find the most appropriate means available to
address them. Gilliam reports that, as of September 1999, 1422 offenders ages
14-21 were serving sentences in a Mississippi Department of Corrections facility, while only 235 were in the boot-camp like Regimented Inmate Discipline
Program, and 79 were in the house-arrest like Intensive Supervision Program.
Gilliam believes that a youthful client, particularly one who has committed a
nonviolent crime, can receive a sentence more appropriate than incarceration,
one that may help him address underlying problems and work toward rehabilitation. The attorney should undertake an investigation, including interviews, to
determine the causes of a client's behavior, and then ascertain an appropriate
alternative sentence, such as diversion to a treatment program, alternative sentencing offered by the Mississippi Department of Corrections, the Regimented
Inmate Discipline Program, a Restitution Center, non-adjudication of guilt,
shock probation, house arrest, or others. Gilliam recognizes that an alternative
sentence will require the consent of the prosecutor or court approval, but reasons
that consent or approval will be easier to obtain if the lawyer is armed with the
necessary information on her client and a reasoned, detailed plan.
This symposium also includes an essay by Larry S. Pozner, which was first
delivered as an address after being named President of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. In Why Do We Do It?,8 Pozner argues passionately that criminal defense lawyers are indispensable guardians of liberty. Citing
examples of governmental injustice ranging from the World War II internment of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, to the McCarthy era, through the abuses
employed by local governments to thwart the assertion of civil rights by AfricanAmericans, and to the present day, Pozner reasons that a vigorous defense bar is
a necessary systemic check against potentially tyrannical government.
In The Constitutionalityof Warrantless Doorway Arrests,9 Jack E. Call argues
for a rule, either as a matter of Constitutional law or police department policy,
mandating police inform a suspect about to be arrested in the doorway of his
home that he has a right to require that the police obtain an arrest warrant.
Existing Supreme Court decisions bracket the issue by allowing warrantless
arrests in public, but disallowing warrantless entry of a home absent exigent circumstances. At present, some lower courts permit police to make a warrantless
doorway arrest so long as the police do not coerce or deceive in calling the suspect to the door, and so long as the suspect does not retreat into the house. Other
lower courts forbid warrantless doorway arrests unless the arrestee acquiesces in
7. 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 361 (1999).
8. 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 275 (1999).
9. 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 333 (1999).
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the arrest. Call suggests that informing a suspect subject to doorway arrest that
police can be required to obtain a warrant would further important Constitutional
values, as "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed."1 Moreover, in Call's view, even a voluntary police department policy to the same effect is prudent, as it would signal to
citizens that the police highly respect the privacy and security of the home.
John Holdridge calls for the elimination of an incongruity he perceives in the
qualification of jurors in capital cases in Selecting CapitalJurors Uncommonly
Willing to Condemn a Man to Die: ContradictoryReadings of Wainwright v. Witt
and Morgan v. Illinois." He begins with the premise that Supreme Court precedent requires exclusion of a juror whose views either for or against the death
penalty would prevent or substantially impair her duty to act in accord with the
instructions and her oath. He further argues that Supreme Court precedent
should be read to require a prospective juror's views on capital punishment be
evaluated in the abstract, not under the anticipated aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of the case at hand. The problem, in Holdridge's view, is that
lower courts have excused for cause jurors whose ability to vote for the death
penalty is substantially impaired, yet have excused for cause only jurors who will
automatically vote against the death penalty. Holdridge states that this problem
is compounded when lower courts refuse to excuse for cause jurors disposed to
impose the death penalty under the anticipated facts of the case, yet do excuse
for cause jurors disposed to impose a life sentence under the anticipated facts.
Holdridge concludes that the Supreme Court should, at the least, require courts
to allow both case specific questions by the prosecution concerning a juror's
willingness to impose a sentence of death and cure specific questions by the
defense concerning a juror's willingness also to consider a sentence of life.
Two papers address the reach of congressional power over arguably local
crime. Barry C. Campbell's student note 2 examines Printz v. United States, 3
which declared certain provisions of the Brady gun control law unconstitutional.
Steven A. Kohnke's comment14 analyzes whether the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Lopez"5 dooms federal law prohibiting the possession
of marijuana. The final paper, Mary Jacq Watson's student Note,' 6 seeks to illustrate how the Supreme Court recently fortified the Fourth Amendment's requirement that government show "special needs" beyond ordinary law enforcement
when it invalidated a Georgia law requiring candidates for certain state political
offices to pass a random drug test.
10. Id.
11. 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 283 (1999).
12. Barry C. Campbell, Note, Federalism, the Constitution, and the Brady Act: States'Rights and the
National Government, 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 393 (1999).
13. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
14. Steven A. Kohnke, Comment, Can Congress Do That? An Analysis of the Federal Prohibitionon
MariuanaPossession, 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 381 (1999).
15. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16. Mary Jacq Watson, Note, Chandler v. Miller: The Civil Liberties Sky is NOT Falling, 19 Miss. C. L.
REv. 421 (1999).
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Each article in this symposium addresses a discreet issue, and collectively they
suggest various interstitial reforms. Still, speaking broadly, all share the common theme of ensuring fairness in criminal prosecutions by enforcing some limit
on the power of the state. The authors thus contribute to an ongoing conversation
necessary for a free society, here by talking about the need to guard against:
convicting an accused with evidence of his general criminal disposition or
propensity; an untrained lawyer representing a capital defendant; imprisoning a
youthful nonviolent offender when rehabilitative alternatives exist; allowing
police further authority for warrantless arrests in the home; impaneling a jury
predisposed to impose the death penalty; expansive federal authority over local
crime; or increasing government authority to conduct suspicionless drug tests.

